Aid Workers, Intelligence Gathering and Media Self-Censorship by McCarthy, Nigel
30                      Australian Studies in Journalism         Aid workers, intelligence gathering and media self-censorship 31




The relationship between aid workers and intelligence gathering 
in conflict zones and the media response has been highlighted 
by several recent events in Kosovo, Somalia and East Timor. 
The over-riding issue is a critical one for journalists; in times 
of  conflict do the principles of  balanced reporting suffer to 
support the “home” side?
Over the past 14 months, the Australian media reported three cases that linked Australian aid workers to intelligence gathering. There was a claim that CARE Australia worker 
Steve Pratt, who during 1999 had been jailed in Yugoslavia for 
espionage, despite Australian protestations of  his innocence, had 
helped set up an intelligence gathering operation for the Organisation 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). There were reports 
of  cooperation between an Australian aid operation and US agents in 
Somalia in 1992; links that had not been reported previously. And 
an Australian aid worker claimed to have filed intelligence reports 
for the Australian government from East Timor ahead of  the pro-
Indonesian militia violence and destruction surrounding the vote for 
independence in August 1999.
In the Kosovo and Somalia situations, it is clear that journalists 
and/or news organisations exercised self-censorship in not reporting 
what they knew. These actions will have their supporters and critics. 
Those who delayed the report about the intelligence role of  the aid 
worker in Kosovo argue they feared jeopardizing international efforts 
to free the worker and his two colleagues. But by not reporting the 
links, Australian readers and viewers were denied relevant facts in 
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judging the Yugoslav action. The detention, trial and sentencing of  
three apparently innocent men became a symbol to many Australians 
of  the excessive regime of  Slobodan Milosevic. Had the reports of  
aid links to intelligence gathering been aired when they were obtained, 
some of  this criticism may have been muted. Likewise, in the Somalia 
incident, the public was left with incomplete reporting to shape their 
views of  an organisation that promotes itself  as independent and 
seeks contributions from well-meaning supporters. In the East Timor 
example the media is less of  a player, but this case is included as 
another current illustration of  the links between aid workers and 
intelligence gathering.
Those supporters of  delaying reporting the links between CARE’s 
humanitarian and peace monitoring projects in Kosovo argue that 
there was a clear potential cost to the lives or well-being of  the three 
detained workers. In Somalia, the journalist feared that reporting the 
CARE cooperation with the military would disrupt the humanitarian 
work aimed at saving hundreds of  thousands of  people from 
starvation. In East Timor, the aid worker who was collecting 
intelligence material for the Australian government argues that earlier 
intervention could have prevented the massacres of  an unknown 
number of  people.
Yugoslavia
CARE Australia workers Steve Pratt and Peter Wallace were 
detained in Yugoslavia in March 1999 and Serb Branko Jelen in 
April. They were later convicted of  passing intelligence to foreign 
organisations. During his imprisonment Steve Pratt made a televised 
confession of  spying against Yugoslavia. Pratt was sentenced to 12 
years in prison, and Wallace and Jelen to four years each.
The plight of  the aid workers attracted considerable attention 
in the Australian media. For example, a survey of  the nationally-
distributed broadsheet newspaper, the Australian, shows that from 10 
April, when the story broke, Pratt and Wallace, and the efforts to gain 
their release, were the front-page lead stories in six of  the 18 days 
the paper appeared and the subject of  editorials on three of  those 
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days (McCarthy 1999). The tone of  the reporting of  the story in 
Australia is indicated by this editorial on 13 April shortly after the 
pair were detained:
Aid workers pawns in a cynical play . . . . The plight of  two men who only 
sought to help others . . . has made the fear and emotion triggered by the 
conflict and dictatorship all too accessible for their fellow Australians . . . 
Milosevic can make a start in the rehabilitation of  his regime in the eyes 
of  the world by quickly ordering the release of  Steve Pratt and Peter 
Wallace (Australian 13 April).
The three men became a focus for Australian perceptions of  the 
lack of  respect for law or human rights by the Milosevic regime, 
as sample headlines from the Sydney Morning Herald and Sun-Herald 
illustrate. On 13 April “Trumped up spying charges”. 17 April 
“Hounded for the crime of  caring. Branded Serbia’s enemies . . .”. 18 
April “The spy game; in Serbia’s eyes CARE workers are guilty until 
proven innocent . . .”. 16 May “Serb demand is blackmail . . .”. 27 
May “Fury over secret spy trial . . .”. 2 June “Injustice in Yugoslavia 
. . .”. 28 May “On trial on Belgrade . . .”. 4 July “Aid duo pawns 
in Yugoslav struggle . . .”. Following the release of  Pratt and 
Wallace in September, one headline on 2 September, summed up 
the Australian sense of  frustration “About bloody time, CARE pair 
on the way home . . .”.
Australia mounted vigorous international efforts to free the trio 
including visits to Yugoslavia by Australian foreign minister Alexander 
Downer and CARE Australia chairman and former Australian prime 
minister Malcolm Fraser. The Australian government supported the 
trio at all times. Pratt and Wallace were released in September and 
Jelen several months later. Following his release Pratt, a former major 
in the Australian Army, said his confession followed “five days of  
intensive interrogation, with psychological torture, sleep deprivation, 
questioning through the early hours of  the morning with other 
extreme measures applied” (Stevens 2000).
The level of  Australian interest in the plight of  the three men can 
be seen in the response to their release. There were press conferences 
and public appearances and a reception at Government House hosted 
by the governor-general Sir William Deane. Yellow ribbons previously 
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hung from the balcony of  Government House were cut. Steve Pratt 
has written and released a book of  his experiences (Pratt 2000). Peter 
Wallace is writing his own account. 
In the Australian media, the December-January period is often a 
quiet news period. The federal and state parliaments go into recess, 
parts of  industry shut down for maintenance and many people 
take Christmas holidays, seeking lazy sunny days on the beach. The 
newspapers have holiday specials, such as collections of  new fiction. 
Television stations are traditionally “out of  ratings” a time when 
viewing audiences are low and repeats can be the order of  the day. 
But in February the pace changes, Australia goes back to work and the 
television stations launch their programming for the year, determined 
to hold existing audiences and win new ones. 
A major indication in the interest in the Pratt, Wallace and 
Jelen story is that both the two publicly-owned television networks 
launched their flagship current affairs programs for the year with 
stories about the trio. However the approach of  the two networks 
was very different. SBS Television, the smaller of  the pair and with a 
multi-cultural charter, revealed an alleged link to intelligence gathering. 
The ABC, the larger of  the two, looked at the hardships the men 
endured and rebutted the SBS claims. 
The SBS report
The Dateline current affairs program on SBS television returned 
for the year on 2 February 2000 with a story that made headlines in 
Australia’s leading papers the following day. The reporter was Graham 
Davis, a journalist with 27 years’ experience and the winner of  
Australia’s foremost journalism award, a Walkley. In the introduction, 
Dateline presenter Jana Wendt said:
Last June SBS uncovered extraordinary information in the story of  
Steve Pratt, Peter Wallace and Branko Jelen. At the time CARE Australia 
Chairman Malcolm Fraser asked that we keep that information quiet 
so as not to jeopardise the release of  the jailed aid workers. Tonight 
we can at last tell the story.
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Unbeknown to many CARE Canada had a contract to recruit monitors 
on behalf  of  the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe, the OSCE. They were to gather political, social and military 
intelligence in Kosovo. 
The contract has raised disturbing questions about the role that CARE 
Canada and its Australian counterpart played in the Balkans. And it has 
placed aid agencies and their operations under suspicion. 
Later we’ll discuss those questions in a studio debate which includes 
CARE Australia’s chief  executive officer Charles Tapp. But first this 
report by Dateline’s Graham Davis in collaboration with SBS World News 
reporters Don Lange and Dennis Grant.
The report, that made up the bulk of  the hour-long program, 
said that Steve Pratt had a role in setting up a program for CARE 
Canada, under contract to the Canadian government, to recruit 
monitors — many of  them former military people — in Kosovo 
for the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Steve 
Pratt travelled for a week in Kosovo with CARE Canada executive 
director, John Watson.
What the program also said was that in June 1999 SBS had learned 
of  the connection between Pratt and the CARE Canada monitoring 
operation and put this to Malcolm Fraser:
Davis — When SBS put a Canada connection to you last year, you asked 
us not to mention this. Were you concerned that it would complicate 
your efforts to gain the release of  these people?
Fraser — Of  course. It was a question of  perception not of  reality. 
I didn’t know what anyone knew. I didn’t know what was going to be 
introduced into the court and if  you’ve got a state of  war, a state of  
siege, Serbs against the world, what could people make of  something 
however innocent?
Fraser did not know what the Serbs knew. In the SBS program 
Yugoslav Deputy Information Minister, Miodrag Popovic, says 
Belgrade did know about Pratt’s role with the monitoring operation. 
Popovic — Actually I was happy to see Australia or the Australian media 
discovered (sic) this story. On the other hand I knew about this but 
you have to understand my stand because it is a minor problem for this 
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country. (A) much bigger problem was the intelligence activities not only 
of  the people from CARE but from the OSCE mission itself. The much 
bigger problem is the plight of  the people in Serbia today. 
Davis (voice over) — Popovic is still convinced the three CARE workers 
were spies, but says they were freed in the national interest.
Popovic — All along we were just trying to say we are defending our 
country and that we are not villains and murderers and those three 
people were pardoned in that cause . . . .
In the debate after the program Charles Tapp, CARE Australia’s 
chief  executive officer, defended peace monitoring and stressed that 
the CARE contract was public knowledge. 
The ABC report
Dateline aired on Wednesday 2 February, Four Corners went to air 
on Monday 7 February. The report, by Liz Jackson, a qualified lawyer, 
a journalist for 14 years and a two-times Walkley award winner, 
had this introduction:
Steve Pratt and Peter Wallace speak for the first time about their arrest 
and imprisonment in Belgrade. Until now the Australian aid workers 
have been unable to tell their stories, fearing the consequences for 
colleague Branko Jelen. Liz Jackson’s report reveals some of  the 
enormous pressure of  their captivity, as well as Pratt’s account of  the 
spying confession.
Branded an exclusive, the Four Corners team had five days to 
respond to the SBS report. Immediately after the introduction came 
these comments:
Wallace — A lot of  people would love to think that we were spies. 
People love — some people love conspiracies and some people think 
it very glamorous and exciting.
Pratt — I think it’s natural that there will be people out there in the 
community who will always think that sort of  thing about people 
who have been in my predicament, and there’s nothing that I can 
do about it.
The bulk of  the report (Four Corners typically runs one story for 
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the program’s full forty-five minute duration) covered the trio’s arrest, 
trial and detention. But at the end of  the report, Jackson returned to 
the SBS report. Pratt’s response was a strong rejection:
Pratt — This is their allegation — that I was knowingly involved in 
a CARE International support activity of  the OSCE as if  the OSCE 
was a spy organisation. Which I reject anyway — the OSCE is a 
very honorable organisation. That’s essentially the SBS allegation. 
And also they allege that that therefore put me and my colleagues in 
jeopardy and that caused us to be arrested. I mean, this is just a load 
of  bloody rubbish.
The SBS perspective
The SBS story is the more dramatic because the allegations of  the 
links with intelligence gathering went further than the ABC’s detailing 
of  the experiences of  the three men. SBS also knew of  the story 
without broadcasting it for some seven months.
In an interview for this paper, the SBS director of  news and 
current affairs, Phil Martin, said the network came across the story 
when a reporter overheard it mentioned in a conversation and 
“followed it up, chased it and nailed it down”. Malcolm Fraser was 
approached but “pleaded” with the SBS reporter not to run the story. 
The agreement was that Fraser would give SBS the full story when 
the men were released. Just 24 hours later, coincidentally, in Martin’s 
words, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alexander Downer, put 
out a press release urging media organisations not to publish any 
information that would jeopardise the release of  the aid workers.
Martin said SBS executives to the highest level, including managing 
director Nigel Milan were kept aware of  the story the network was 
sitting on. And there was division over whether the story should 
be run or held. Martin says:
I certainly am aware of  two senior editorial executives who took the view 
that we should publish the story no matter what the consequences. And 
others of  us took the view that if  the publication of  the story resulted 
in harmful action against any of  the protagonists, then that was not 
something we should do.
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Martin does not believe that SBS should be seen as supporting 
the NATO side by not running the story:
The story was indirectly related to that campaign. But principally it was 
a story about Australian aid workers in another country and it was made 
very clear to us that had we run the story we may have endangered 
their lives. And so there is another question there and that is the 
responsibility of  media to ensure that by its actions it doesn’t endanger 
physical life.
The NATO campaign would have continued no matter what we had 
reported. I mean what we had wasn’t of  such earth-shattering importance 
that the NATO bombers would have turned back and not bombed.
For seven months SBS remained ready to publish if  another news 
organisation reported the story. Martin calls it the “best story we have 
done all year”. He adds that with their exclusive access to Pratt and 
Wallace, the ABC was restricted to running the “official biography” 
and unable to ask “hard questions” about their role.
Somalia
The allegations of  aid worker involvement in intelligence gathering 
in Kosovo sparked claims of  NGO involvement in Somalia in 
1992. Then, United States forces led a United Nations sanctioned 
humanitarian intervention aimed at ending fighting between warring 
factions and bringing food to the starving population. Australian 
journalist Sue Neales was there as the correspondent for the Sydney 
Morning Herald and the Melbourne Age, two major Australian 
papers owned by the Fairfax group. On 9 February, 2000, eight 
years later, Neales and Andrew Clennell reported in the Sydney 
Morning Herald:
The aid agency CARE Australia directly assisted United States operatives 
during the United Nations-sanctioned military and humanitarian 
intervention in war-torn Somalia. On December 15, 1992, two days 
before a UN force marched into the starving and besieged town of  
Baidoa, CARE Australia sheltered, housed, transported and advised 
four US men who identified themselves to journalists as officers of  
the US State Department.
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The article went on to say the men parachuted into Baidoa, stored 
their “sophisticated communications equipment” in a CARE building, 
slept in the CARE compound, travelled in a white, clearly marked 
CARE vehicle and used the roof  of  a CARE Australia building 
as a command post, displaying fluorescent marker lights to guide 
incoming forces. The head of  the CARE Australia mission, Lockton 
Morrisey, identified as a “former Australian Army worker” in the 
report, briefed the agents. 
CARE Australia executive director, Charles Tapp, was quoted 
in the report:
Management of  CARE Australia at the time and today had — and 
have — no knowledge of  any of  the allegations put forward by Fairfax 
newspapers regarding CARE’s operations in Somalia in 1992. The 
activity simply would not be tolerated by CARE Australia’s management 
or board. An aid worker found to be involved in any covert activity 
would be immediately dismissed. 
The allegations of  CARE involvement were supported by a former 
US special envoy to Somalia, Robert Oakley, who, in a follow-up 
report, told the Herald “operatives” from a joint CIA and Defence 
Intelligence team were in Somalia at the time and posed as State 
Department officials ahead of  the arrival of  the US force (Riley 
2000). The Herald was unable to speak to Lockton Morrisey, who 
left CARE in late 1999, but quoted his lawyer as saying he had helped 
US officials “concerning the security position the ground” in Somalia 
in 1992 but added “…none of  the work done by (Morrisey) or for 
that matter CARE Australia or CARE US, while he was in charge 
of  the relevant operations, was relevant to any military operations 
undertaken by either the United States or the United Nations” 
(Clennell 2000).
The day the Herald reported the association between CARE and 
the US “operatives” was a Wednesday, the night Dateline goes to air. 
Dateline followed up the newspaper report in an interview between 
presenter Jana Wendt and journalist Sue Neale s:
Wendt — Why, Sue, have you chosen to write this story now? It is 
eight years ago?
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Neales — Well obviously there is a current controversy concerning 
CARE Australia and the possible blurring of  their lines, where they do 
sometimes seem to get involved with military and political issues. At the 
time, I felt compromised and was ethically concerned about what CARE 
was doing, but at the time I took the decision, made the judgement, that 
the story the world needed to know about at that time was that there 
were hundreds of  thousands of  people around Baidoa starving for lack 
of  food, and that that was the key issue to write about … you are very 
aware as a journalist, that if  you write negative articles about aid agencies, 
particularly in a crisis like this, it does affect public donations.
Wendt — As I said, CARE Australia refutes your story comprehensively, 
but is it possible that under those circumstances, where people were 
starving, that CARE might not have had another option if  we accept 
your story?
Neales — I think that is obviously the decision that the head of  mission 
took, that the aid agency . . . couldn’t operate until the UN came to town. 
And that’s the situation I accept fully now and then. The issue is though, 
should an aid agency remain independent and neutral and separate from 
military and government involvement? And that is where I thought, in 
this instance, CARE Australia probably crossed the line.
East Timor . . . and other places
Almost 12 months before the reports of  CARE Australia’s 
involvement in intelligence gathering in Kosovo and Somalia, another 
Australian aid worker said he had made intelligence reports to the 
Australian Government. Lansell Taudevin, a former Methodist 
minister, went to East Timor in 1996 for the French-owned Egis 
Consulting. Egis had a contract for an AusAID (the Australian 
government aid organisation) water program. Over the next three 
years, and as the brutal Indonesian hold on East Timor began to attract 
world attention ahead of  the August 1999 vote for independence, 
Taudevin travelled extensively through East Timor, engaged in aid 
work but also collecting intelligence.
Taudevin (2000) writes: 
I had been asked to provide information and commentary by AusAID 
and embassy officials in Canberra and Jakarta. This I had done in a 
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situation in which I had a specific contract (with a managing company — 
not AusAID) that forbade me to become involved in politics.
Taudevin sent back hundreds of  reports that included warnings 
“. . . about the arming and training of  militias. I provided concrete 
evidence but both my reports and my presence were dismissed as 
‘extremist’ and ‘alarmist’.” He left East Timor in April 1999 after his 
life was threatened by pro-Indonesian militia groups and after he was 
also accused of  spying and ordered to go by the Indonesia Army. 
Taudevin first went public with his story in April 1999 on the ABC 
current affairs radio program AM. In September, ahead of  the ballot 
for independence, “the militia went on a rampage, killing an unknown 
number of  civilians, destroying most of  the islands infrastructure and 
forcing hundreds of  thousands from their homes” (Williams 1999) in 
a campaign predicted by Taudevin.
Not only did Taudevin claim his intelligence assessments were 
rejected but also that both his employer and the Australian government 
tried to stop him talking to the media. He was dismissed as a 
“fruitloop” (Taudevin 2000, p. 8) by an assistant to Alexander 
Downer, the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs. However, 
the Australian Opposition spokesman on Foreign Affairs, Laurie 
Brereton, said he placed considerable value on Taudevin’s reports 
(Dateline 2000b). In January 2000 Taudevin took legal action against 
his employer and the Australian government claiming payment for 
his intelligence work.
Several other reports covered aid agencies gathering, or being 
approached to gather, intelligence information.1 The Australian, on 4 
February 2000, followed SBS World News in reporting comments from 
the chief  executive of  the Fred Hollows Foundation, Mike Lynskey, 
that the aid agency had been approached to gather information for 
unidentified government agencies. Lynskey said the agency had been 
approached to “. . . provide information and to give people access to 
the people that we’ve found and to help fill in the picture between the 
cracks in some of  the places that we work”. He added the approach 
had been rejected because “It’s not our role. Our role is to do a 
particular job. We’re not beholden to the Australian government or 
any other government” (Gilchrist 2000).
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The Age reported that approaches to gather information were 
not restricted to Australian aid workers. On 13 February it reported 
“International humanitarian aid agencies face increasing pressure 
from Western governments to cooperate in gathering military 
intelligence, according to European Union sources.” Two unnamed 
EU diplomats were quoted:
It is a fact of  life for aid workers in the field that Western government, 
Western militaries, want to use them to glean information for them. 
And when they need the cooperation of  the military — be they warring 
factions or allied peacekeepers — to deliver humanitarian aid, it is 
becoming increasingly difficult for them to avoid the overt and subtle 
pressure to comply.
And:
It is a well-known fact in some circles that aid agencies have been 
a cover for gatherers of  military intelligence. But anywhere there is 
a conflict spooks will seek a cover — maybe you should also point 
out that military intelligence operatives also pose as journalists in 
conflict situations.
Reaction
CARE Australia chair Malcolm Fraser anticipated the division and 
the debate that would follow the report on CARE’s role in the OSCE 
monitoring operation in the Dateline program on 2 February: 
I think it was unfortunate. I wish it hadn’t happened … a humanitarian 
organisation in an emergency area as the Balkans plainly was, should not 
also be involved in monitoring, now that’s very clear.
Fraser added that he didn’t know about the Australian involvement 
in the monitoring program until after Pratt, Wallace and Jelen had 
been arrested: 
I believe I should have known and if  I had known, I think the program 
might have ended … Let’s put it this way, with the wisdom of  hindsight, 
in my view, CARE Australia’s view is that a monitoring operation should 
not be attached in any way to a humanitarian operation.
The Dateline program also reported the reaction of  another aid 
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organisation. The Australian president of  Medecins Sans Frontieres, 
Fiona Terry, said:
I’m very surprised that (CARE) would engage in such a blatantly 
ambiguous position . . . I think most people would be shocked and 
disappointed about it . . . I do think there could be bad repercussions 
and, yes, it could compromise very much our ability to work in conflict 
areas.
That was the theme in the editorial, features and letters pages in the 
days immediately after the Dateline program went to air. 
On 4 February, the editorial in the Australian commented:
Spying endangers relief  efforts . . . Revelations that CARE Australia’s 
Steve Pratt played a part in helping Canadian colleagues set up an 
information-gathering system to monitor peacekeeping efforts in Kosovo 
raises questions about the role of  humanitarian bodies . . . the issue is the 
burden of  perception that such monitoring activities by aid organisations 
create. Should they be involved with anything but delivering humanitarian 
assistance? . . . The controversy surrounding Pratt demonstrates that a 
vigorous debate is needed urgently to define the role of  aid bodies and 
at what point that role becomes compromised.
Opposite the editorial, a feature piece by a former Australian 
intelligence officer, Warren Read, said:
Stark line divides aid workers and the military. The furore over the 
apparent involvement of  an Australian aid worker in the peace monitoring 
activities of  (OSCE) highlights the crucial need for international aid 
groups to stay squeaky-clean . . . Not only was tension high in Kosovo 
but the suspicion among Serbian counterintelligence officers (those 
charged with the task of  catching foreign spies on their soil) that OSCE 
might be riddled with spies was even higher …How then, CARE Canada 
could have actively involved itself  in peace-monitoring operation defies 
all logic and common sense. 
Among the views in the Australian’s letters section:
Humanitarian organisations must avoid confusion between humanitarian 
tasks and intelligence tasks. CARE Canada’s negotiation with Steve 
Pratt lends weight to the case put by the Serbian government that Steve 
Pratt as country coordinator contravened Serbian laws by undertaking 
42                      Australian Studies in Journalism         Aid workers, intelligence gathering and media self-censorship 43
intelligence activities. NGO staff  often forget that local laws do apply to 
them. (Andrew MacLeod, Albert Part, Vic.).
Steve Pratt, say it isn’t so. We trusted you. We supported you. We believed 
you. We prayed for you. (A. Higgins, Adelaide).
All is lost for CARE. How can they expect anyone to give them money 
for humanitarian work, and claim to be a humanitarian organisation, 
when their sister organisations get involved in such activities as described 
in the Australian yesterday . . . CARE Australian executive director Mr 
Charles Tapp should resign — or be forced from his position. (Jane 
Turner, Redfern, NSW).
The issue was still attracting editorial comment several days later 
with the Sydney Morning Herald writing on 9 February:
Reports from a war zone . . . it is also clear now that the CARE 
organisation was much more seriously compromised, much more 
seriously than previously thought, by information gathering operations 
. . . . What might seem quite separate to CARE would not necessarily 
look that way to the Yugoslav authorities, especially once the NATO 
bombardment of  Belgrade got under way . . . their (Pratt, Wallace 
and Jelen) experience is a sobering warning not only to CARE but to 
other humanitarian agencies as well of  the extreme need, in times of  
conflict, to keep the distinction between humanitarian aid work and 
‘peace monitoring’ absolutely clear.
World Vision Australia, another major aid agency, commented on 
13 February. Chief  executive Lynn Arnold wrote that aid agencies 
often needed to seek the protection of  military forces in the delivery 
of  aid. This posed ethical issues, Arnold added, because the goals 
of  the aid groups and the military are quite different. However he 
observed some of  the tools of  modern aid work, vehicles, radios 
and satellite phones could be interpreted as the tools of  potential 
espionage. Arnold wrote “It is clear that the time has come for 
humanitarian groups to take stock of  themselves and establish 
internationally accepted guidelines for working in zones of  conflict.”
On 17 February, a two-sentence report in the Sydney Morning 
Herald read “CARE chief  resigns. CARE Australia’s chief  executive, 
Mr Charles Tapp, has quit. He will become deputy director-general 
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of  AusAID, the federal government’s agency in charge of  foreign 
aid”. 
NGOs
Governments around the world are increasingly turning to non-
government organisations (NGOs) for the delivery of  services. This 
is because aid can be delivered more cheaply, efficiently and at a 
distance from government via NGOs than through government 
channels. The number of  NGOs is growing rapidly with about 29,000 
international groups in 1995; and dozens of  new organisations are 
being created daily. In a feature article on NGOs on 2 February 2000 
The Economist reported: “By being ‘close to the action’ some NGOs, 
perhaps unwittingly, provide good cover for spies . . . .”
The Kosovo crisis in particular and the nature of  the NGO 
response poses questions about the role of  aid agencies. In Kosovo, 
NATO constructed the refugee camps and provided security, with 
the UNHCR losing its traditional position as the controller of  
the humanitarian effort. In the eyes of  one commentator (Rieff  
1999), the Kosovo crisis reached the limits of  “independent 
humanitarianism” with “the NGOs and UNHCR . . . reduced to 
the status of  implementing partner, or subcontractor, or even 
helpless onlooker”.
The major NGOs themselves are trying to maintain their standards 
and reputation. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Movement, supported by other big NGOs, has issued a code of  
conduct for workers in disaster relief. Its goal is to “maintain the 
high standards of  independence, effectiveness and impact to which 
disaster response NGOs . . . aspire”. Point four of  the code is the 
most important for this paper and states “We shall endeavor not to act 
as instruments of  government foreign policy,” then adds:
We will never knowingly — or through negligence — allow ourselves, or 
our employees, to be used to gather information of  a political, military or 
economically sensitive nature for governments or other bodies that may 
serve purposes other than those which are strictly humanitarian, nor will 
we act as instruments of  foreign policy of  donor governments.
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NGOs offer promise but not without problems. They can respond 
more quickly to crisis than governments and, in part because of  
new information and communication technologies, they can marshal 
extensive international support. Most big NGOs also maintain 
sophisticated media and public relations divisions. In her highly-
regarded Foreign Affairs article in 1997 Jessica T. Matthews wrote:
For all their strengths, NGOs are special interests . . . . The best of  them, 
the ablest and most passionate, often suffer most from tunnel vision, 
judging every public act by how it affects their particular interest … the 
need to sustain growing budgets can compromise the independence of  
mind and approach that is their greatest asset.
During the research for this paper, a document revealing CARE’s 
attitude to public relations was obtained from an NGO source. There 
is no reason to doubt its authenticity. Dated 10 February 2000 it is 
titled “Communication strategy for CARE USA regarding allegations 
about CARE’s independence”. The document was written to guide 
staff  in the face of  any questions arising from the incidents reported 
in the Australian media. The two-page document provides a “set of  
talking points should questions be asked” and warns the “range of  
possible questions is enormous”.
Staff  are urged to stress CARE’s commitment as an non-partisan, 
independent humanitarian organisation. If  Somalia is raised, the 
documents urges delaying tactics with the suggestion “reply that 
we are talking of  events that happened eight years previously and 
would need time to get the additional information”. On Pratt 
and Wallace:
CARE has always maintained — and still maintains — that their trial was 
a travesty of  justice and that the charges were without foundation. The 
men have suffered enough in prison without the further anguish of  a 
“trial” by media. Further publicity about such allegations also endangers 
other aid workers in the field.
The CARE suggestions, including delaying tactics and emotive 
terms such as “trial” by media echo the government or big business 
response that is an anathema to many supporters of  NGOs. 
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Information gathering
Few people would disagree that NGOs need to gather information 
as part of  their role in managing projects in places such as Kosovo. 
When the three CARE workers were convicted 11 Australian aid 
organisations (Wilson et al 1999) expressed their distress and 
opposition. On information gathering they said:
We emphasize that the gathering of  information relating to humanitarian 
needs and the security of  field staff  from UNHCR, other UN bodies, 
local bodies and other NGOs is part of  the normal duties of  aid workers 
in such settings. It is also normal for such information to be shared with 
head offices so that together field and head office staff  can plan future 
assistance in a difficult context or take evacuation decisions.
From the media reports it is difficult to establish the information 
flow, if  any, between CARE’s humanitarian operation and the 
monitoring operation. However, the model information flow 
described in the statement by the aid agencies suggests there are few 
checks on its distribution.
CARE Canada’s national director, John Watson, who travelled for 
a week with Steve Pratt in Kosovo, told Dateline:
It was quite clear to us that on the traditional humanitarian side it was 
getting very difficult. They were blowing up more houses than we could 
repair, we didn’t have land-mine proof  vehicles . . . you had to know 
where the land mines were or where the conflict was. So there was a 
definite advantage to having a peace monitoring program going on to 
CARE’s traditional humanitarian work. We decided the two could be 
quite separate and therefore we went ahead with it. 
This poses the question of  what, and to whom, was the 
advantage?
On the ABC’s Four Corners program Liz Jackson reported:
Jackson — All aid agencies in Yugoslavia were by this time receiving daily 
security briefings from the Organisation for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe who had a high profile role monitoring the cease-fire in 
Kosovo.
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Wallace — So that we were aware of  where the security risks were, 
what areas we should avoid in terms of  where the conflicts were, 
demonstrations, mines, that sort of  thing.
Jackson — You didn’t give information back to them?
Wallace — Absolutely not.
Jackson — Steve Pratt was sending much of  this security information 
back to CARE in his situation reports, parts of  which real like this: 
“Significant government forces, back about 12 VJ (army) heavy tanks 
and armoured cars, launched operations against known KLA strong 
points recently established closer to Podujevo.”
The reports were seized by the Yugoslav authorities when the aid 
workers were detained. The military tone of  some of  the reports 
fuelled Yugoslav concerns about spying. Pratt (Saunders 2000) would 
acknowledge that some of  the reports were “. . . indiscreet and were 
offensive to the (Milosevic) regime”. 
Conclusion
The different reports of  the events considered in this paper 
are all from journalists and news organisations of  good reputation 
in a country that prides itself  on press freedom and quality. Yet 
self-censorship by journalists and/or news organisations is clear 
and readers and viewers have been presented with incomplete or 
dramatically different accounts of  the various events. They can 
choose to believe one version or another, or to remain sceptical 
of  the individuals and organisations, including the media and 
governments, involved.
NGOs continue to grow in size and influence. Their supporters 
are often critical of  the lack of  accountability of  government and 
business. But NGOs too must be questioned and held to account. 
Their values and goals, however laudable, can become distorted and 
confused like those of  any organisation. The entire NGO community 
needs to continually examine its values and practices in the knowledge 
that bad practices by one organisation can tarnish the image of  all. 
In the environment in which NGOs often function, there is no room 
for hair-splitting or rationalisation. In that environment, a tarnished 
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image can threaten the work of  organisations and the safety of  its 
workers. A reputation — good or bad — gained in one region will 
spread quickly to other regions with little room for fine distinctions.
The media need to be cautious in their dealings with NGOs. 
Because journalists might share the apparently non-political and 
humanitarian goals of  NGOs, their scrutiny should not be relaxed. 
Full and frank reporting of  the activities of  NGOs should be pursued 
with the vigor consistent with the ideals of  good journalism. The 
ability and willingness — dictated by NGOs need for continuing 
public support — to take journalists to, or to help them in, difficult 
locations and operations should not be allowed to color the opinion 
and approach of  journalists and news organisations. This is particularly 
true where journalists are frustrated by budget constraints and new 
technologies change news gathering and presentation.
The three men who were arrested in Kosovo are now free and 
Slobodan Milosevic remains in power. The military and humanitarian 
projects in Somalia went ahead. However, the United Nations troops 
were forced to leave in 1995 and, at best, the result of  Western 
intervention is mixed. Australia and the world would finally respond 
to the plight of  the East Timorese. Different responses at different 
times would have resulted in different outcomes that are, of  course, 
impossible to gauge. 
Fundamental to this paper is the question of  when journalists and 
news organisations should report, or not report, what they know. In 
part, this goes back to what is one of  the most fundamental issues 
in journalism; news values, and how these conflict with other values. 
One tenet of  journalism is transparency. The Age journalist in Somalia 
decided public support for a CARE humanitarian mission was more 
important than the disclosure of  that mission’s links with the military. 
SBS Television decided on a course of  action that it calculated was 
least threatening to three aid workers, but a course that denied the 
public information that was relevant to shaping public sentiment, 
and perhaps through that government action. If  the CARE action 
in Somalia had been reported when it was observed then, perhaps, 
the ensuing debate would have, years later, prevented CARE from 
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pursuing the path it took in Kosovo. Then SBS would not have had to 
delay its reporting with whatever implications that carried.
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Notes
1 The use by the CIA of  media workers for intelligence gathering and 
agents posing as journalists is explored in Gersh Hernandez, D. (1996), 
“Posing as journalists”, Editor and Publisher, 2 March, v. 129, n. 9, p. 8 that 
draws on Johnson, L.J. (1989), America’s Secret Power: the CIA in a democratic 
Society, New York, Oxford University Press, and others.
Mr McCarthy is an Australian television journalist currently based 
in Jakarta.
